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ARE PRIVATE PRISONS TO BLAME FOR 
MASS INCARCERATION AND ITS EVILS? 
PRISON CONDITIONS, NEOLIBERALISM, 
AND PUBLIC CHOICE 
Hadar Aviram* 
ABSTRACT 
One of the frequently criticized aspects of American mass 
incarceration, privatized incarceration, is frequently considered 
worse, by definition, than public incarceration for both philosophical-
ethical reasons and because its for-profit structure creates a 
disincentive to invest in improving prison conditions. Relying on 
literature about the neoliberal state and on insights from public 
choice economics, this Article sets out to challenge the distinction 
between public and private incarceration, making two main 
arguments: piecemeal privatization of functions, utilities, and services 
within state prisons make them operate more like private facilities, 
and public actors respond to the cost/benefit pressures of the market 
just like private ones. This Article illustrates these arguments with 
several examples of correctional response to the conditions caused by 
the Great Recession, showing how public and private actors alike 
adopt a cost-minimizing, financially prudent approach, sometimes at 
the expense of prison conditions and inmate human rights. This 
Article ends by suggesting that, in a neoliberal capitalist environment, 
prohibitions and litigation alone cannot improve prison conditions, 
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and that policymakers need to consider proper market incentives 
regulating both private and public prisons. 
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They are telling this of Lord Beaverbrook and a visiting Yankee 
actress.  In a game of hypothetical questions, Beaverbrook asked the 
lady: “Would you live with a stranger if he paid you one million 
pounds?”  She said she would.  “And if he paid you five pounds?”  
The irate lady fumed: “Five pounds.  What do you think I am?”  
Beaverbrook replied: “We’ve already established that.  Now we are 
trying to determine the degree.” 1 
INTRODUCTION 
Anyone seeking a reason to rail against the American correctional 
system will find plenty of easy targets.  With approximately 2.2 
million people behind bars2—1 in 100 American citizens,3 with more 
                                                                                                                 
 1. O. O. McIntyre, As O. O. McIntyre Sees It, MUSCATINE J. & NEWS-TRIBUNE, 
Jan. 2, 1937, at 3.  The anecdote has also been attributed to Bernard Shaw, Winston 
Churchill, and several others. 
 2. Incarceration, SENTENCING PROJECT, http://www.sentencingproject.org/
template/page.cfm?id=107 (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 3. Press Release, Pub. Safety Performance Project, U.S. Prison Population 
Drops for Third Year as States Adopt New Policy Strategies (Aug. 8, 2013), available 
2014] ARE PRIVATE PRISONS TO BLAME? 413 
in certain states4—the American system is a frightening colossus of 
confinement and the world leader in incarceration rates.5  Vastly 
more people are under some form of correctional control—probation 
or parole—raising the number of people supervised by the criminal 
justice system to 7.3 million.6  Between 1980 and 2012, the total 
number of state and local prisoners in the United States rose from 
501,886 to 2,228,400—a 344% increase7—while the U.S. population 
grew in the same time only from 226.5 million to 313 million—a 38% 
increase.8  Shockingly, these numbers are not justified by the need to 
control crime.  Rather, crime rates have declined since the 1980s.9  
Scholars studying the connection found little causal connection 
between the increase in incarceration and the decrease in crime, 
attributing only 10% of the decline, at most, to incarceration.10  The 
conditions of incarceration, while diverse across the nation, are so 
appalling that many state prisons and county jails are under some 
form of federal court supervision.11  Most recently, the Supreme 
Court found the physical and mental health care in California prisons 
                                                                                                                 
at http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/2013/08/08/us-prison-
population-drops-for-third-year-as-states-adopt-new-policy-strategies. 
 4. Press Release, Pub. Safety Performance Project, One in 31 U.S. Adults are 
Behind Bars, on Parole or Probation (Mar. 2, 2009), available at 
http://www.pewtrusts.org/en/about/news-room/press-releases/0001/01/01/one-in-31-
us-adults-are-behind-bars-on-parole-or-probation. 
 5. Incarceration, supra note 2. 
 6. Press Release, Pub. Safety Performance Project, supra note 4. 
 7. This calculation includes 319,598 prison and 182,288 jail inmates in 1980, and   
1,483,900 prison and 744,500 jail inmates in 2012. THE SENTENCING PROJECT, FACT 
SHEET: TRENDS IN U.S. CORRECTIONS 2 (2013), http://sentencingproject.org/
doc/publications/inc_Trends_in_Corrections_Fact_sheet.pdf.  During the same time, 
the federal prison population grew from 25,000 to 219,000 inmates. NATHAN JAMES, 
CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R42937, THE FEDERAL PRISON POPULATION BUILDUP: 
OVERVIEW, POLICY CHANGES, ISSUES, AND OPTIONS 2 (2014).  Notably, however, the 
prison population began to decline in 2009, the year after the Great Recession, and it 
has continued to steadily decline since then. Total U.S. Correctional Population 
Declined in 2012 for Fourth Year, BUREAU JUST. STAT. (Dec. 19, 2013), 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/press/cpus12pr.cfm. 
 8. History: 1980 Fast Facts, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, https://www.census.gov/
history/www/through_the_decades/fast_facts/1980_new.html (last updated Aug. 7, 
2014).  The current population is approximately 319 million. U.S. and World 
Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU, http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 9. FRANKLIN E. ZIMRING, THE GREAT AMERICAN CRIME DECLINE 49 (2006). 
 10. See DON STEMEN, RECONSIDERING INCARCERATION: NEW DIRECTIONS FOR 
REDUCING CRIME 4 (2007), available at http://www.thecommoninterest.org/docs/
VeraNewDirections.pdf. 
 11. MALCOLM M. FEELEY & EDWARD L. RUBIN, JUDICIAL POLICY MAKING AND 
THE MODERN STATE: HOW THE COURTS REFORMED AMERICA’S PRISONS 13, 39–40 
(1998). 
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appalling—one inmate dying needlessly from iatrogenic causes every 
six days12—indeed, so appalling that they could not be improved 
without considerable population reduction.13  Eighty thousand 
inmates are housed under conditions of solitary confinement,14 in tiny 
cells with no outside stimulus,15 suffering abundant forms of neglect16 
and deteriorating mental health.17  The United States is one of the 
only Western industrialized democracies in which the death penalty is 
alive and well, retained in thirty-two of its states.18  At least a quarter 
of the United States prison population consists of nonviolent drug 
offenders serving lengthy sentences,19 while the legacy of the War on 
Drugs continues to fuel horrifying violence in the United States20 and 
Mexico.21 
                                                                                                                 
 12. Brown v. Plata, 131 S. Ct. 1910, 1927 (2011); JONATHAN SIMON, MASS 
INCARCERATION ON TRIAL: A REMARKABLE COURT DECISION AND THE FUTURE OF 
PRISONS IN AMERICA 133–35 (2013). 
 13. Brown, 131 S. Ct. at 1922. 
 14. Joseph Stromberg, The Science of Solitary Confinement: Research Tells Us 
that Isolation is an Ineffective Rehabilitation Strategy and Leaves Lasting 
Psychological Damage, SMITHSONIAN.COM (Feb. 19, 2014), http://www.smithsonian
mag.com/science-nature/science-solitary-confinement-180949793/?no-ist. 
 15. Robert M. Ferrier, Note, “An Atypical and Significant Hardship”: The 
Supermax Confinement of Death Row Prisoners Based Purely on Status—A Plea for 
Procedural Due Process, 46 ARIZ. L. REV.  291, 294–95 (2004). 
 16. Terry A. Kupers, What to Do with the Survivors? Coping with the Long-Term 
Effects of Isolated Confinement, 35 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 1005, 1009 (2008); Josiah D. 
Rich et al., Medicine and the Epidemic of Incarceration in the United States, 364 
NEW ENG. J. MED.  2081, 2081 (2011). 
 17. Craig Haney, A Culture of Harm: Taming the Dynamics of Cruelty in 
Supermax Prisons, 35 CRIM. JUST. BEHAV. 956, 956 (2008); Terry A. Kupers, How to 
Create Madness in Prison, in HUMANE PRISONS 47 (David Jones ed., 2006). 
 18. Max Fisher, Map: Which Countries Use the Death Penalty?, ATLANTIC, July 6, 2011, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/international/archive/2011/07/map-which-
countries-use-the-death-penalty/241490/; States with and Without the Death 
Penalty, DEATH PENALTY INFO. CENTER, http://www.deathpenaltyinfo.org/states-
and-without-death-penalty (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 19. See E. ANN CARSON & DANIELA GOLINELLI, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, 
PRISONERS IN 2012: TRENDS IN ADMISSIONS AND RELEASES, 1991–2012, at 38 app. 
tbl.5, 43 app. tbl.10 (2013), available at http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/
p12tar9112.pdf; NILA NATARAJAN ET AL., JUSTICE POLICY INST., SUBSTANCE ABUSE 
TREATMENT AND PUBLIC SAFETY 1 (2008), available at http://www.justicepolicy.org/
images/upload/08_01_REP_DrugTx_AC-PS.pdf; People Sentenced for Drug 
Offenses in the U.S. Correctional System, DRUGWARFACTS.ORG,  
http://www.drugwarfacts.org/cms/Prisons_and_Drugs#sthash.WHjtG9jD.dpuf (last 
visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 20. Meredith May, Many Young Black Men in Oakland are Killing and Dying for 
Respect, S.F. CHRON., Dec. 9, 2007, http://www.sfgate.com/bayarea/article/Many-
young-black-men-in-Oakland-are-killing-and-3299781.php. 
 21. IOAN GRILLO, EL NARCO: INSIDE MEXICO’S CRIMINAL INSURGENCY 116 
(2011). 
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Much academic and popular literature on American incarceration 
frames its critique of this phenomenon in the context of what has 
come to be known as the Prison Industrial Complex (PIC).  Indeed, 
the term returns approximately 555,000 results in a Google search.22   
Here are some definitions of the PIC provided by advocacy sites: 
 [A] term we use to describe the overlapping interests of 
government and industry that use surveillance, policing, and 
imprisonment as solutions to economic, social and political 
problems. . . .  [Power over inmates] is also maintained by earning 
huge profits for private companies that deal with prisons and 
police forces; helping earn political gains for “tough on crime” 
politicians; increasing the influence of prison guard and police 
unions; and eliminating social and political dissent by oppressed 
communities that make demands for self-determination and 
reorganization of power in the US.23 
 [A] set of bureaucratic, political, and economic interests that 
encourage increased spending on imprisonment, regardless of the 
actual need.  The prison-industrial complex is not a conspiracy, 
guiding the nation’s criminal-justice policy behind closed doors.  
It is a confluence of special interests that has given prison 
construction in the United States a seemingly unstoppable 
momentum.  It is composed of politicians, both liberal and 
conservative, who have used the fear of crime to gain votes; 
impoverished rural areas where prisons have become a 
cornerstone of economic development; private companies that 
regard the roughly $35 billion spent each year on corrections not 
as a burden on American taxpayers but as a lucrative market; and 
government officials whose fiefdoms have expanded along with 
the inmate population.24 
 “[A]n interweaving of private business and government interests. 
Its twofold purpose is profit and social control. Its public 
rationale is the fight against crime.”25 
Eric Schlosser points out that “[p]rivate prisons are the most 
obvious, controversial, and fastest-growing segment of the PIC,”26  
                                                                                                                 
 22. GOOGLE (search term “Prison Industrial Complex”), https://www.google.com/
?gws_rd=ssl#q=prison%20Industrial%20complex (last visited Nov. 1, 2014). 
 23. What Is the PIC? What Is Abolition?, CRITICAL RESISTANCE, http://critical
resistance.org/about/not-so-common-language/ (last visited Oct. 22, 2014). 
 24. Eric Schlosser, The Prison-Industrial Complex, ATLANTIC, Dec. 1, 1998, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/magazine/archive/1998/12/the-prison-industrial-
complex/304669/. 
 25. Eve Goldberg & Linda Evans, The Prison-Industrial Complex and the Global 
Economy, GLOBAL RES., (Oct. 18, 2001), globalresearch.ca/articles/EVA110A.html. 
 26. Schlosser, supra note 24. 
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and indeed, these broad definitions frequently mention private prison 
companies as the most salient example of its harms.  In an eponymous 
piece from 1998, Angela Davis writes: 
Prison privatization is the most obvious instance of capital’s current 
movement toward the prison industry.  While government-run 
prisons are often in gross violation of international human rights 
standards, private prisons are even less accountable.  In March of 
this year, the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA), the 
largest U.S. private prison company, claimed 54,944 beds in 68 
facilities under contract or development in the U.S., Puerto Rico, 
the United Kingdom, and Australia.  Following the global trend of 
subjecting more women to public punishment, CCA recently opened 
a women’s prison outside Melbourne.  The company recently 
identified California as its “new frontier.” 27 
Indeed, critical prison literature commonly takes on private prison 
companies, assuming that private incarceration is, by definition, worse 
than public incarceration, both for philosophical-ethical reasons and 
because its for-profit structure creates a disincentive to invest in 
improving prison conditions.  These concerns are reasonable and 
understandable.  The concept of private enterprises designed to 
directly benefit from human confinement and misery is profoundly 
unethical and problematic.  But while I share the critics’ concerns 
with private prisons, I think that focusing on private prison companies 
as the source—or even the salient representation—of all evil in 
American incarceration is misguided and myopic. 
My concern with the critical movement’s focus on private 
incarceration does not stem from wide-eyed belief in an unregulated, 
free market’s ability to do well by doing good.  Quite the contrary, an 
unregulated correctional market is a sure recipe for the indifference 
and cruelty we see in America’s prisons every day.  However, the 
focus on private actors as the bogeymen of American incarceration 
belies a naïve understanding of neoliberal politics and a gross 
underestimation of the extent to which everyone—private and public 
actors alike—responds to market pressures and conducts his or her 
business, including correctional business, through a cost/benefit 
prism.  This Article argues that the profit incentives that brought 
private incarceration into existence, rather than private incarceration 
itself, are to blame for the PIC and its evils.  Further, these evils 
cannot be remedied in full without carefully structuring incentives for 
                                                                                                                 
 27. Angela Davis, Masked Racism: Reflections on the Prison Industrial Complex, 
COLORLINES (Sept. 10, 1998), http://colorlines.com/archives/1998/09/masked_racism_
reflections_on_the_prison_industrial_complex.html. 
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correctional agencies and institutions that prioritize the goals we want 
to see manifested in the world, namely, recidivism reduction and 
humane confinement conditions. 
The Article relies on two main bodies of literature from opposing 
political and economic perspectives: the progressive and radical 
literature on neoliberalism, and the libertarian literature on public 
choice economics.  The literature on neoliberalism describes the 
retreat of the state from its welfarist responsibilities and the 
emergence of a disturbingly unmitigated form of capitalism.28  Public 
choice literature exposes the ways in which public actors—
legislatures, judges, politicians, and other government agencies and 
individuals—conduct their affairs under the same microeconomic 
principles that have traditionally been used to analyze the behavior of 
private corporations and businesses.29  While public choice economists 
often write from a libertarian standpoint,30  celebrating the retreat of 
the state and the power of the free market, one need not accept their 
ideological premises to see the realism in their analysis.  That public 
actors, like private ones, seek to increase benefits and avoid costs, and 
that they have no incentive to improve incarceration conditions does 
not mean that such incentives cannot, or should not, be created. 
This Article proceeds in three parts.  Part I presents the classic 
ethical and utilitarian arguments against prison privatization, relying 
on a recent, much-publicized decision of the Israeli High Court of 
Justice, which refused to allow the functioning of private prisons in 
Israel.  It then proceeds to provide theoretical background on the two 
bodies of literature that guide my analysis: critiques of the neoliberal 
state and public choice economics. 
Part II proceeds to question the premise that private prisons are to 
be blamed for a substantial part of the American incarceration crisis.  
As this Part argues, focusing on private prisons gives them, at the 
same time, too much and too little weight: too much because the 
share of private prisons in the overall incarceration project is fairly 
small, and quantitative analysis fails to attribute prison growth to 
                                                                                                                 
 28. See generally JOE SOSS ET AL., DISCIPLINING THE POOR: NEOLIBERAL 
PATERNALISM AND THE PERSISTENT POWER OF RACE (2011); LOÏC WACQUANT, 
PUNISHING THE POOR: THE NEOLIBERAL GOVERNMENT OF SOCIAL INSECURITY 
(2009). 
 29.  For a comprehensive review of this perspective, see MAXWELL L. STEARNS & 
TODD J. ZYWICKI, PUBLIC CHOICE CONCEPTS AND APPLICATIONS IN LAW (2009). 
 30. See Herbert Gintis, Beyond Homo Economicus: Evidence from Experimental 
Economics, 35 ECOLOGICAL ECON. (SPECIAL ISSUE) 311 (2000), available at 
http://tbauler.pbworks.com/w/file/fetch/48548115/gintis_homo%2520economicus.pdf. 
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private prison growth; and too little because focusing on private 
prison companies misses the fact that public correctional institutions 
are also, essentially, privatized in terms of most of their internal 
functions. 
Part III turns to public actors in the criminal justice system and sets 
out to demonstrate how, against a backdrop of neoliberal politics, 
they behave remarkably like private prison companies.  This Part 
highlights three aspects of the similarities: scandals emerging from 
individual actors’ pursuit of profit at the expense of inmates, systemic 
neglect and abuse stemming from cost/benefit analysis, and the 
complicated relationship between public and private actors in the 
aftermath of the Great Recession.  This last aspect shows states and 
private prison companies negotiating, wheeling and dealing, closing, 
and repurposing prisoners, importing and exporting them across state 
lines, as techniques to cope with the impact of the Great Recession on 
the American correctional landscape. 
The conclusions of this analysis are not all grim.  It is possible to 
create conditions that incentivize prisons, both public and private, to 
improve incarceration conditions and to implement programs that 
promote rehabilitation, reentry, and recidivism reduction.  This 
Article therefore ends by offering some suggestions as to the main 
characteristics of such an incentive system and explains why it would 
be superior to any effort to prohibitively regulate private prisons. 
I.  MAPPING AND QUESTIONING THE TRADITIONAL ARGUMENTS 
ON PRIVATE INCARCERATION 
A. The Ethical Argument 
In 2005, the Israeli High Court of Justice was petitioned to rule a 
new amendment to the Prison Ordinance unconstitutional.31  The 
amendment in question allowed a private prison entrepreneur to 
                                                                                                                 
 31. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin. (unpublished) 
[2009] (Isr.), translated at http://www.privateci.org/private_pics/Israel_Ruling.pdf.  
Israel has no real constitution, instead “basic laws” that have constitutional power, 
particularly “Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty.”  As per the quasi-
constitutional construct in this Basic Law, Section 5 disallows a “deprivation of 
restriction of the liberty of a person by imprisonment, arrest, extradition or 
otherwise” unless it is made (1) by law (2) “befitting the values of the State of 
Israel[,]” (3) “enacted for a proper purpose[,]” and (4) “to an extent no greater than 
is required.” Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.), 
translated at http://www.knesset.gov.il/laws/special/eng/basic3_eng.htm. 
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operate a private prison in Israel.32  The petition, on behalf of civil 
rights organizations as well as potential inmates in the new prison, 
presented various reasons for the amendment’s unconstitutionality.33  
While the petitioning civil rights organization focused on the ethical 
problem inherent in the privatization of punishment,34 the comments 
on behalf of the potential inmates pertained to the concerns that 
privatizing the industry would lead to a decrease in minimal prison 
conditions. 35 
While Israel lacks a formal constitution, it has a series of “basic 
laws” of a constitutional nature, adopted by a supermajority of 
lawmakers.   One such law is Basic Law: Human Liberty and 
Dignity,36 which awards the rights to life and dignity,37 personal 
freedom,38 and privacy.39  Any infringement upon these rights must be 
done “by law that befits the values of the State of Israel, for an 
appropriate purpose, and not greater than necessary.”40  Accordingly, 
the Court set out to examine the purpose and the extent to which 
human rights are infringed by the law allowing prison privatization. 
Despite the fact that petitioners invited the Court to examine not 
only ethical arguments, but also the actual impact privatization might 
have on incarceration conditions, the Court chose to focus on the 
former.  Chief Justice Beinicsh argued that economic profit motives 
are not the ones that the law would deem an appropriate purpose of 
deprivation of rights,41 and that any extent to which people’s freedom 
is restricted for this purpose is greater than necessary.42  The 
concurring opinions also found that the law came up short of fulfilling 
the constitutional requirements.  Justice Procaccia’s concurrence 
found that the purpose might be improving prison conditions by 
relieving prison overcrowding.43   While Justice Procaccia deemed this 
an appropriate purpose, it could be achieved via means other than 
                                                                                                                 
 32. Id.; see also Prison Ordinance (Amendment No. 28), 5764-2004, SH No. 1935 
p. 348 (Isr.). 
 33. HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin. at 37. 
 34. Id. at 36–37. 
 35. Id. 
 36. Basic Law: Human Dignity and Liberty, 5752-1992, SH No. 1391 (Isr.). 
 37. See id. § 2. 
 38. See id. § 5. 
 39. See id. § 7. 
 40. See id. § 8. 
 41. See HCJ 2605/05 Academic Ctr. of Law and Bus. v. Minister of Fin. 
(unpublished), at 54, 69 [2009] (Isr.). 
 42. See id. at 57. 
 43. See id. at 130–31. 
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prison privatization.44  Justice Naor’s concurring opinion also argued 
that the law is unequal in creating discrimination between public and 
private inmates,45 as well as problematic in allowing prison providers 
to profit from inmate labor.46 
The sole dissenter, Justice Levy, argued that without empirical data 
on the function and conditions of private prisons, determining its 
impact on individual rights and freedoms was impossible. 47 
The decision was widely lauded as progressive and revolutionary 
among journalists48 and activists,49 and several academics expressed 
philosophical critiques of private incarceration.  Yoav Peled and 
Doron Navot,50 as well as Avihay Dorfman and Alon Harel,51 have 
argued that some governmental decisions simply cannot be executed 
by private entities.  Incarceration, as an expression of the public 
response to criminal behavior, is one such function, as it is an 
expression of the public will to punish, and as such could not be 
privatized. 52 
Similar ethical critiques of incarceration are offered beyond the 
context of the Israeli decision.  Michael Reisig and Travis Pratt53 rely 
on Weber’s state rationality theory to point out that, because criminal 
punishment is administered in response to violations of the laws of 
the state, it is inherently related to the state’s power.  They add that 
the pervasiveness of punishment in America makes the coercion 
involved in it even more closely tied to the state.54  This perspective 
stems directly from Enlightenment-era liberal theories of the state, 
none of which offered a basis for delegating what, by nature, is the 
                                                                                                                 
 44. See id. at 130–32. 
 45. See id. at 162. 
 46. See id. at 164. 
 47. See id. at 188. 
 48. See generally Prison Privatization Cancellation: Revolutionary Liberal 
Ruling, HAARETZ (Nov. 20, 2009), http://www.haaretz.co.il/news/law/1.1291075. 
 49. See generally Einat Gal & Na’ama Carmi, Crime and Punishment: Privatizing 
Prisons—Position Paper, PHYSICIANS FOR HUM. RTS., available at 
http://www.phr.org.il/uploaded/26%20novb04.doc.pdf. 
 50. See generally Yoav Peled & Doron Navot, Private Incarceration—Towards a 
Philosophical Critique, 19 CONSTELLATIONS 216 (2012), available at 
http://onlinelibrary.wiley.com/doi/10.1111/j.1467-8675.2012.00679.x/pdf. 
 51. See generally Avihay Dorfman & Alon Harel, The Case Against 
Privatization, 41 PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 67 (2013), available at http://law.huji.ac.il/upload/
privatization(1).pdf. 
 52. See id. at 72. 
 53. See generally Michael D. Reisig & Travis C. Pratt, The Ethics of Correctional 
Privatization: A Critical Examination of the Delegation of Coercive Authority, 80 
PRISON J. 210, 212 (2000). 
 54. See id. at 212. 
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state’s response to a violation of its rules.55  Moreover, even from the 
perspective of libertarian philosophies, individuals do not have the 
right to harm each other; the necessity to do so has been delegated to 
the state.56 
Some ethical support for this position can be found in Norbert 
Elias’ classical work The Civilizing Process.57  Relying on an 
abundance of historical documentation, Elias argues that the 
formation of the Early Modern states was characterized by a 
sublimation of what gradually came to be regarded as base and 
violent urges.  Blood lust was tamed, more refined table manners 
started to appear, and some bodily functions that were conducted in 
public were relegated to the private realm.  Social historians relying 
on Elias’ analysis, such as V.A.C. Gatrell,58 Pieter Spierenburg,59 and 
Robert Nye,60 have also associated the decline in disorganized 
violence between individuals to the increasing power of the state.  
Duels, for example, emerged to control and codify violence within 
acceptable boundaries of honor and regulation.  Gradually, as the 
state took over punishment, such forms of individual-on-individual 
recourse disappeared.  These socio-historical works are, in a way, an 
illustration of Thomas Hobbes’ Leviathan61: the process by which 
people give their power of aggression to the emerging modern state. 
In the American context, there are other issues that make 
privatization disturbing from an ethical perspective.  As Michelle 
Alexander argues in The New Jim Crow,62 there is a direct linkage 
between the abolition of slavery and the exclusion of inmates from 
the clause forbidding forced labor.  Indeed, in the decades following 
the abolition of slavery, the prison population, which during the civil 
war was largely white, gradually shifted to over-represent inmates of 
color and subject them to forced work practices not dissimilar to 
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antebellum practices.  Moreover, during the nadir of race relations, 
private chain gangs proliferated, disturbingly resembling the private 
profit involved in slave labor a few decades earlier.63  This disturbing 
heritage evokes considerable discomfort with the idea of profiting 
from human suffering which, in a different form, was a blight that still 
casts a dark shadow on race relations in the United States. 
B. The Incentive Argument: For-Profit Incentives in the 
Neoliberal State Lead to Worsened Conditions 
The second argument frequently made against prison privatization 
addresses the problematic incentives resulting from allowing 
incarceration for profit.  This argument is deeply rooted in critical 
analysis of the neoliberal state. 
The term “neoliberalism” was originally coined in 1938 to describe 
fairly moderate economic policies, consisting of a free market with 
competition, but supported by a strong and impartial state.64  Even 
after the usage of the term declined in the 1960s, moderate 
Democrats such as President Clinton and Vice President Gore used it 
to describe their political ideology as late as the 1990s.65  The current 
common usage of the term emerged in Chile, where it was used by 
left-wing oppositionists to describe the free market regime advocated 
by President Pinochet and his hired economic advisors, who were 
Chicago-school libertarian economists.66  Since then, “neoliberalism” 
has usually been taken to mean broad support for a capitalist, free-
market economy, and for a reduction in the regulatory power of the 
state.  Neoliberalism usually advocates for free competition and 
privatization, as well as the removal of external controls of the 
market, such as tariffs, standards, and restrictions on capital flows and 
investment.  With this ideology comes a call for a reduction in state 
expenditures on social services, such as health and education, and a 
shift in emphasis from communitarianism and interdependence to 
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individual achievement and responsibility.67  The assumption 
underlying neoliberal ideology is that if the government and the legal 
system refrain from intervening in free market activities, the balance 
created by supply and demand leads to a healthy equilibrium that 
happens on its own, invoking the “invisible hand” of the market—a 
term coined in Adam Smith’s The Wealth of Nations.68 
Several commentators have observed that the state’s retreat from 
its welfare and social functions is often accompanied by greater 
oppression of members of the lower rungs of society, who are most 
likely to find themselves criminalized.  In Disciplining the Poor,69 Joe 
Soss, Richard Fording, and Sanford Schram argue that current 
policies addressing poverty governance are the result of a 
combination of two ideologies: neoliberalism, consisting of a retreat 
from welfare reform and a lack of commitment to combat property, 
and paternalism, focused on infantilizing the poor and dictating their 
courses of action.  Similarly, in Punishing the Poor,70 Loïc Wacquant 
ties the increase in incarceration in the United States to the turn in 
American economics.  According to Wacquant, punishment rates rose 
not because of fear of crime, but because of social insecurities 
brought about by the undermining of the class and race hierarchies.   
As a result, the state has created a link between “workfare” and 
“prisonfare,” penalizing property and expecting individual 
responsibility despite systemic class differences and differences in 
opportunities.  Ironically, to Wacquant, the economic deregulation 
and retreat of the state from its welfarist function led to an increase in 
its punitive function, “managing” its poor through criminalization and 
incarceration, rather than providing them with opportunities for labor 
and mobilization.71 
These ideologies, argue privatization opponents, play out in a 
particularly destructive form in the context of prison privatization.  
First, they make private incarcerating companies complicit in 
overcrowding and mass incarceration.  One argument is that private 
prison companies are compensated on a per-diem basis: i.e. the state 
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pays the company a price per-inmate-per-bed-per-day.  Since a 
certain number of inmates is necessary to make the operation 
profitable, contracts between states and private companies often 
specify the occupancy rate the state is obligated to supply.  In that 
form, prison population and incarceration become a function not of 
crime rates and public safety, but of supply and demand and 
contractual obligation. 
Moreover, unregulated private correctional institutions whose 
primary motives are profit are incentivized to seek it at all costs, and, 
with a lack of a strong state regulatory power over their operations, 
are likely to skimp and save on costly goods, services, and programs.  
As a result, there are serious concerns that conditions in private 
prisons will be worse, since unregulated private enterprises will 
maximize their profit—and their bloated executive pay—at the 
expense of the inmates.  The state finds private greed difficult to 
regulate because citizens repeatedly vote down bond issues that fund 
prison expansion while at the same time demanding increases in 
incarceration.72 
Finally, a business model tends to expand and encompass new 
fields; in search of new profit, private prison companies seek new 
markets, such as the undocumented detention market.  As David 
Sklansky found, “crimmigration”—the criminal management of 
immigration—has increased as a response to market conditions, and 
not merely as a response to concerns about terrorism.73   In summary, 
some critics of privatization point out its evils as embedded in the 
overall structure of neoliberalism. 
C. The Efficiency Argument: Public Choice and Its Critics 
A third set of arguments on privatization addresses the extent to 
which it is more profitable for the state, as a whole, to run its 
institutions by delegating them to private hands.  These arguments 
come from public choice theory, which is best defined as the 
application of economic theory to the field of politics and 
government.74  There is considerable diversity in public choice 
literature; some writings accept some premises of microeconomics 
without dispute, such as the assumptions of perfect rationality and 
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perfect information, some dispute them and bring empirical 
considerations into the analysis, some accept the premise that there is 
social consensus about the “common good,” and some assume that 
there will be competing concepts of the “common good” among 
citizens and institutions.75 
However, one characteristic of public choice literature is deep 
skepticism about the typical distinction between the private and 
public realms of law and of society.76  Public choice scholars analyze 
the legislative process, judicial decision-making, administrative 
regulation, and more using the same cost-benefit tools traditionally 
relegated to the study of private markets.  From this standpoint, 
public choice often critiques the state for undue interference in the 
operations of the market.  It perceives “big government” intervention 
as undemocratic in the sense that it immunizes itself and the 
industries it regulates from being open to market considerations.77  
This is not merely a democratic critique; public choice economists 
believe in the positive contribution of market-driven competition to 
policy development.78 
In the specific context of prison privatization, public choice 
economists usually support private enterprises, arguing that a 
competitive marketplace in any field—including incarceration—
motivates efficiency.79  The sensitivity to market fluctuations means 
that private companies can be flexible in response to correctional 
needs.80  As one proponent argues, competition begets creativity: 
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[A] contract to run a government program—say, a prison—only 
specifies a basic service, but the agent can invest in thinking up 
various innovations to the service.  Some cut costs, some improve 
quality.  Appropriate some of the net benefit by renegotiating the 
contract.  Incentives are suboptimal, but at least better than those of 
public managers, who have a more precarious bargaining position.81 
Moreover, at least in the 1980s, the increase in demand for 
incarceration simply could not be matched solely by the public 
sector.82   Population reduction orders could only provide a temporary 
relief for overcrowding, and more institutions would be needed in the 
long run.83  The funding structure for private institutions, primarily via 
lease-revenue bonds, meant that they could be built fairly quickly, 
without being clogged in budgetary bureaucracy difficulties.84  Finally, 
the different nature of private prison firms and public sector 
correctional employee unions meant different abilities and incentives 
to lobby for greater incarceration.85  Privatization, by nature, 
fragments the market, which means private firms may have less power 
and incentive to lobby for more incarceration.86  By contrast, in places 
where correctional employee unions have been allowed to gain 
considerable political power, they have been powerful players in the 
state correctional policies.87 
But not everyone agrees that prison privatization is necessarily 
more efficient than public incarceration.  Some critics of the 
libertarian position argue that any savings on private institutions will 
necessarily be only for the short term because the per-diem 
compensation scheme requires that prison occupancy be maintained, 
thus keeping population—and the costs of its incarceration—up, in 
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order to comply with contractual obligations.88  Moreover, some 
questions are raised regarding the ability of a private industry to 
employ the kind of economy of scale that would yield significant 
savings.89 
This raises the question of whether private prisons are more 
efficient than public ones.  There are several important considerations 
that make such efficiency comparisons difficult.  First, private prison 
critics argue that the private prison companies that wish to present an 
impressive bottom line tend to omit some of their costs, such as 
salaries, from the operational costs of the facilities.90  Second, any 
comparative analysis has to take into account that private prisons are 
typically newer, and as such have to incur less maintenance costs than 
older institutions.91  Nonetheless, there are a few dozen studies 
comparing private and public institutions—enough to obtain a 
general picture. 
In a 1999 study,92 Travis Pratt and Jeff Maahs conducted a meta-
analysis that encompassed thirty-three such evaluations of private and 
public facilities from twenty-four independent studies of adult male 
prisons.93  In comparing the efficiency of these institutions, they 
controlled for differences in institutional characteristics across 
independent studies, such as the size of the facility (economy of 
scale), the security level, and the age of the facility.94  The dependent 
variable was the effect-size estimate: the daily per-diem cost of 
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operating the facility.95  The study found that ownership of the 
institution, on its own, was an insignificant predictor of the 
standardized measure of inmate cost per day.96  Other institutional 
characteristics were much more significant: the inmate population 
size, the age of the institution, and the security level of the facility.97  
In general, in terms of per diem costs for maximum-security 
institutions, private institutions did better, while public facilities fared 
better in studies of minimum- and medium-security institutions.98  A 
newer meta-analysis by Brad Lundahl, Chelsea Kunz, Cyndi 
Brownell, Normal Harris, and Russ Van Vleet, also found no 
significant difference in costs and savings between private and public 
institutions.99  The analysis also found that the competitive market did 
not create any improvements in terms of quality of confinement, 
which did not differ considerably between private and public prisons.  
Public prisons fared slightly better in terms of the skill trainings they 
offered to inmates and had slightly fewer inmate grievances.100 
The next Part of this Article will challenge the classic arguments 
against privatization in light of public choice and neoliberal 
skepticism of the public/private divide. 
II.  QUESTIONING THE PUBLIC/PRIVATE DIVIDE 
A. Private Prisons’ Share in Mass Incarceration 
The political and scholarly energy invested in debating the merits 
and shortcomings of private incarceration begs the question of 
whether private prisons are the cause of the massive increase in 
incarceration since the late 1970s.  Progressive advocacy materials 
tend to highlight the power and growth of private prison companies 
like the Corrections Corporation of America (CCA) and the GEO 
Group.  Commenting on the Rutherford Institute website, John 
Whitehead highlights the bottom line as a “$70 billion gold mine,” 
and mentions CCA’s recent proposal to prison officials in forty-eight 
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states to buy and manage public prisons at a substantial cost savings 
to the states—provided that these prisons contain at least 1000 beds, 
and states maintain a ninety percent occupancy rate in the privately 
run prisons for at least twenty years.101 
Similarly, the ACLU report on mass incarceration bemoans its 
“exponential growth,”102 pointing out that: 
[A]s mass incarceration led to disastrous effects for the nation as a 
whole, one special interest group—the private prison industry—
emerged as a clear winner.  A massive transfer of taxpayer dollars to 
the private prison industry accompanied the unprecedented increase 
in incarceration and the rapid ascent of for-profit imprisonment.103 
“Accompanied,” however, does not necessarily equal “caused,” but 
in many publications this distinction remains blurry.  This is 
particularly the case in writings examining the connection between 
racial stratification and the prison industrial complex,104 as well as in a 
report by the Progressive Labor Party, which accuses the prison 
industry of being “an imitation of Nazi Germany with respect to 
forced slave labor and concentration camps.”105  A causal explanation 
can, of course, be provided.  Joel Dyer’s The Perpetual Prison 
Machine106 argues that the increase in prison population is a function 
of three components: the consolidation of large media corporations 
that sensationalize crime and violence content; the increasing use of 
public opinion polling by politicians who wish to pander to “popular” 
views about crime; and the collaboration between the state and 
private corporations, who allow governments to expand incarceration 
without the initial expenditure for construction.  As Julia Sadbury 
argues: 
[T]he mutually profitable relationship between private corporations 
and public criminal justice systems enables politicians to mask the 
enormous cost of their tough-on-crime policies by sidestepping the 
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usual process of asking the electorate to vote for ‘prison bonds’ to 
raise funds to build publicly operated prisons.  Instead, they can 
simply reallocate revenue funds from welfare, health or education 
into contracts with privately run-for-profit prisons.  Since the 1980s, 
the private sector has allowed prison building to continue, even 
where public coffers have been exhausted by the prison construction 
boom.  It has been rewarded with cheap land, tax breaks and 
discounts in sewage and utilities charges, making prison companies a 
major beneficiary of corporate welfare.  These three components 
constitute the “political and economic chain reaction” that we have 
come to know as the prison industrial complex: a symbiotic and 
profitable relationship between politicians, corporations, the media 
and state correctional institutions that generates the racialized use of 
incarceration as a response to social problems rooted in the 
globalization of capital.107 
There are very good reasons to be concerned about the effects of 
punitive policies on communities of color, though a nuanced 
approach to the racialized aspects of prison would not ignore the 
spread of incarceration of white inmates in the heartland,108 nor would 
it dilute the horrors of the “old Jim Crow” by drawing blanket 
comparisons between the two regimes.109  Still, this popularized form 
of blaming private prison companies in part for the ills of the prison 
system is so common that it has been adopted, unquestioningly, by 
the National Research Council (NRC) in its recently published report 
on the reasons for mass incarceration,110 assuming that readers will 
accept it as given: 
By the mid-1990s, the new economic interests—including private 
prison companies, prison guards’ unions, and the suppliers of 
everything from bonds for new prison construction to Taser stun 
guns—were playing an important role in maintaining and sustaining 
the incarceration increase.  The influence of economic interests that 
profit from high rates of incarceration grew at all levels of 
government, due in part to a “revolving door” that emerged 
between the corrections industry and the public sector.  Another 
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factor was the establishment of powerful, effective, and well-funded 
lobbying groups to represent the interests of the growing corrections 
sector.  The private prison industry and other companies that benefit 
from large prison populations have expended substantial effort and 
resources in lobbying for more punitive laws and for fewer 
restrictions on the use of prison labor and private prisons . . . .  Many 
legislators and other public officials, especially in economically 
struggling rural areas, became strong advocates of prison and jail 
construction in the 1990s, seeing it as an important engine for 
economic development.  The evidence suggests, however, that 
prisons generally have an insignificant, or sometimes negative, 
impact on the economic development of the rural communities 
where they are located.111 
In his critique of the NRC report,112 John Pfaff mentions that it 
cites numerous popular sources, with Ruth Gilmore’s Golden Gulag113 
and Heather Ann Thompson’s Why Mass Incarceration Matters114 as 
its only academic sources.115  The evils of private incarceration and the 
pervasive incentives notwithstanding, it is important, according to 
Pfaff, to keep in mind the share of private incarceration in the overall 
correctional market.  As of 2010, only 8% of prisoners were housed in 
private prisons, about 7% in state systems, and about 16% in the 
federal system.116  Of the thirty states that contracted out, the median 
percentage of inmates in private prisons was about 10%, and no 
state’s percentage exceeded 45%.117  The outcome is a concentrated, 
but not monopolistic, prison industry.118 
Elsewhere,119 Pfaff points out more problems with the theory that 
privatization was a main contributor to mass incarceration.  Not only 
does the private prison industry house relatively low rates of inmates, 
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it cannot in itself be accountable for even that percentage of the 
incarceration market.  While the industry has, according to a Justice 
Policy Institute report,120 donated over $6 million to state races in the 
last five election cycles, Pfaff argues that, based on the Institute’s 
same source, these donations need to be considered in the larger 
context of state lobbying and spending.  He argues the funds provided 
by private companies are vastly outnumbered by the donations of 
public and non-profit lobbyists such as the educational lobby, and 
total political spending ran $14.5 billion, a much vaster sum than the 
private prison lobby’s contribution to political races.121 
While Pfaff’s analysis ignores the fact that private prison 
companies may choose to spend specifically on bills that push mass 
incarceration,122 his conclusions about the percentage of private 
institutions among all U.S. incarceration should give pause to popular 
proponents of the prison industrial complex theories.  Using Bureau 
of Justice Statistics data, Pfaff charts the state’s rate of incarceration 
growth between 2000 and 2008 as a function of the percent of each 
state’s prisoners that are held in private facilities.123  He finds no 
connection between percent of private inmates and prison growth.124 
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FIGURE 1.  PRIVATE PRISONS AND PRISON GROWTH, 2000–2008125 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Pfaff’s chart raises a few difficult questions.  The data depicts 
prison growth in privatized institutions, but ignores the fact that many 
of the inmates housed in Arizona, Oklahoma, Florida, and Texas are 
out-of-state inmates imported to those states.   It is unclear whether 
his prison growth data attributes the numbers of those prisoners to 
their state of origin or to the incarcerating state.  This is particularly 
notable in states like Hawaii, which incarcerates close to thirty 
percent of its inmates in private facilities on the mainland.126 
Despite these shortcomings and difficulties, Pfaff’s conclusion that 
it is inaccurate to blame mass incarceration on the privatization of 
prisons127 seems fairly sound.  However, the conventional PIC 
explanations are not only too cruel to privatization, they are too kind 
to it.  They focus on CCA and GEO as the be-all and end-all of 
incarceration.  Privatization mentality is much more pervasive and 
intrusive, to the point that it is no longer easy, or sensible, to draw 
firm distinctions between private and public prisons. 
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B. Even Public Prisons Are Privatized 
The aforementioned decision by the Israeli High Court of Justice 
was very adamant in its ethical condemnation of private prisons.  
However, it explicitly noted that the unconstitutionality of the 
amendment does not rule out any privatization of prison services 
within a public prison, such as construction, laundry, feeding, and 
other services.128 
In her critique of the Israeli decision,129 Hila Shamir argues that the 
opinion represents an antiquated and unsophisticated perception of 
the market, which unduly distinguishes between the state and the 
market, creating an unhealthy dichotomy between public and private 
actors.130 
Similarly, Malcolm Feeley has criticized the decision based on 
empirical work conducted in Australian private institutions.131  Feeley 
argues that the condemnation of privatization as an expression of 
modernity is ahistorical and ignores multiple, accepted historical 
examples of private criminal justice.132  Moreover, while Shamir 
argues that the concept of the state as separate from the market is 
unsophisticated, Feeley argues that the concept of the state itself is 
flawed—the decision perceives the state as a Leviathan,133 rather than 
the disaggregated group of different actors and sectors.134 
These critiques of the private prison condemnation arguably fit the 
American correctional market better than its Israeli and Australian 
equivalents.  Admittedly, the share of private prison companies in 
owning and running prisons is much smaller than the popular 
literature suggests.  But to focus on this small percentage is to ignore 
a vast spectrum of privatized, for-profit incarceration services that 
have been privatized in public prisons.  It is probably more sensible to 
perceive privatization, not as an either/or option, but rather as a 
continuum of private-sphere involvement in the provision of 
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correctional services.135  Of course, private prison industries are 
commonplace in public prisons as well as in private ones, and benefit 
extensively from the competitiveness of prison labor.136  But many 
other services within prisons, from food137 to rehabilitative 
programs,138 have been privatized.  The examples that follow illustrate 
the extent to which private services have permeated public 
institutions. 
Perhaps the phenomenon that has received the most negative 
attention recently is the privatization of health services.139  While 
prisons have never excelled at providing health care to inmates, after 
the Attica revolt, the provision of health care to inmates came to be 
viewed as an Eighth Amendment right.140  Since then, however, the 
overall neoliberal perspective on the role of the state has changed 
dramatically, and its retreat from welfare responsibility on the outside 
has clearly changed on the inside as well.  This has included a 
transformation in the perception of the inmate, from being ward of 
the state to a consumer of services.141  As a result, public and private 
prisons have narrowed their healthcare offerings to “bare life” 
sustenance.142  One effect of the privatization of prison health care has 
been muddled accountability for medical negligence, and, as Wil 
Hylton has noted, many practitioners working for private companies 
reportedly have had their licenses revoked in other states.143  Hylton’s 
investigation of the prison’s approach to hepatitis revealed a strong 
motivation to save money at the expense of providing inmates with 
hepatitis treatment,144 which led to noncompliance with the Centers 
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for Disease Control’s protocols for treating the epidemic.145  Private 
health care providers fiercely fight journalists who expose instances of 
medical neglect in prisons.146  Paul von Zielbauer’s journalistic 
investigation into Prison Health Services, a private prison provider, 
exposed the problematic nature of private health care in local jails.147  
Zielbauer recounts horrifying examples of neglectful healthcare, 
which show that the hope of efficient care is shattered by scant and 
unqualified medical staff and unpunished employee misconduct,148 
prompting scathing reports by the New York State Commission of 
Correction.149  It should probably be noted that inmates tend to be in 
worse health than the general population, are more dependent on 
alcohol and drugs, and are thus particularly vulnerable to faulty 
medical care.150 
One recent example of medical misconduct occurred when Nicole 
Guerrero, a pregnant inmate in a public prison in Wichita County, 
Texas, called for help when her water broke in solitary 
confinement.151  A nurse working with a private prison provider, who 
was later found to have had an expired license, did not heed 
Guerrero’s plea for medical assistance, and the baby died shortly after 
its birth.152  Guerrero is suing the nurse and Correctional Healthcare 
Management, the private firm, for medical malpractice.153 
Another industry within prison privatization that has been the 
subject of abundant criticism is the phone company.  Telephone 
conversations from prisons include a variety of hidden charges, 
including exorbitant connection fees and per-minute charges, which 
invariably fall upon the shoulders of family and friends who are in 
contact with inmates.  This is a particularly important issue given how 
essential telephone services are to inmates for staying in contact with 
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their families and to the system overall, given the importance of 
family contact and visitation and their proven impact on recidivism 
reduction.154  Supportive families of inmates cite the difficulties of 
visitation and telephone calls as a hindrance and as a financial and 
emotional hardship.155  There have been multiple litigation efforts 
surrounding the excessive fares charged by private phone companies 
contracting with public prisons, as well as efforts to regulate such 
fares.156  Given these issues, and particularly the logistical and 
financial difficulties in visitations, especially in remotely located 
prisons,157 it should be a priority for public and private prisons alike to 
make phone calls accessible. 
A less visible private function is that of transportation companies, 
which are private businesses that serve public and private prisons.158  
The biggest private transportation service is Transcor, which is owned 
by CCA.159  These transportation services have yielded several serious 
problems, including dangerous driving,160 improper security leading to 
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escapes,161 and even inmates being burned alive in a defective bus.162  
Also notable are more than a few instances of sexual and physical 
assault of inmates in the hands of private transportation employees.163 
While public prison guards lobby hard to differentiate themselves 
from private corporate correction employees, there is an increasing 
market for training of public prison guards, including riot 
preparation,164 with the addition of tourist attractions and exhibit 
halls.165  These, in part, support industries of weapons designed to 
quell riots and ease arrests, such as tasers.166 
The conclusion to be drawn from these findings is that the public 
perception of the prison industrial complex is both too grim and too 
rosy.  Contrary to some of the PIC critical literature, the share of fully 
private institutions in the market is narrow, their impact on 
policymaking is considerably smaller than perceived, and their 
contribution to mass incarceration, while not negligible, fails to 
explain the growth of the U.S. prison population or its oppression in 
any meaningful way.  However, expanding one’s perspective beyond 
the particular companies that run entire institutions exposes a 
spectrum of privatized operations in public prisons that are also 
driven by profit motivations.  Therefore, any ethical or utilitarian 
ailment that can be leveled against private prison companies can also 
be leveled against public institutions, which are increasingly private in 
name only.  Moreover, accusing private companies of profiteering 
from the prison crisis—which is true, but a convenient scapegoat—is 
taking the heat off the real culprits: states, and particularly state 
prosecutors, who are the ones driving the prison crisis in the first 
place with untoward punitive charging policies.167 
But even this critique does not fully address the scope of the 
problem.  The distinction between the public and private sector is not 
only futile because of the increased privatization within public 
institutions, but also because it assumes that private actors are 
motivated by different incentives than public ones.  The next Part 
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relies on public choice insights to argue that, in fact, public actors 
consider cost/benefit factors just as frequently as private ones, both as 
individuals and on the institutional level.  And as the incarceration 
shifts following the Great Recession of 2008 have revealed, private 
and public actors are negotiating, “wheeling and dealing,” in 
remarkably similar ways, in mutual response to market pressures to 
decrease incarceration. 
III.  PUBLIC ACTORS AS MARKET PLAYERS 
A. Public Incarceration Conditions and the Ugly Pig Contest 
In a symposium titled Capitalism, Government, and the Good 
Society, political scientist and former North Carolina libertarian 
gubernatorial candidate Michael Munger used a unique simile to 
explain the choice between the state and private actors: 
In North Carolina at the state fair, we have what in effect are beauty 
contests for pigs.  So you might imagine in one of the categories at 
the state fair there is a Big Pretty Pig contest.  And there aren’t 
many entrants because there’s big pigs, and there’s pretty pigs, but 
there’s not many big pretty pigs.  So there’s just two; we have the 
two entrants.  The first one comes out and the judge goes, ‘Oh, God, 
that’s an ugly pig!  Let’s give the prize to the second one.’  Well, he 
hasn’t seen the second pig.  Now it’s true that the first pig is ugly.  
But why would you have a decision based on the fact that there’s 
problems with one system, the other one must be better?  But that’s 
precisely what people who want to reject market solutions in some 
ways are advocating.  So the world is imperfect, our knowledge is 
limited, that particular pig of market solutions is in many ways 
pretty ugly.  The world is hard. The problem is that advocates of 
state intervention often want to award the prize to the invisible pig: 
the state.  But when you actually take a look under bright lights, 
government failures are just as ugly, just as prevalent, and in some 
ways harder to control than market failures. 168 
The comparison is hardly offensive, and possibly euphemistic, 
when used to examine incarceration conditions.  The serious critiques 
leveled at private prison conditions are, of course, justified.  Some 
recent incidents include the disturbing audit conducted in October 
2012 at the CCA-owned Ohio Correctional facility, which found 
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forty-seven violations of state prison standards,169 most related to 
severe overcrowding of low-risk offenders under the supervision of 
inexperienced guards.170  Similarly, Otter Creek Correctional Center 
in Wheelwright, Kentucky, had its state funding pulled in August of 
2012 after Hawaii removed all 168 female inmates it had housed at 
the facility due to allegations of sexual abuse by prison guards.171  In 
another egregious instance of private prisons run amok, GEO 
removed its presence entirely from Mississippi in April 2012, after 
Federal Judge Carlton Reeves wrote that GEO-run Walnut Grove 
Youth Correctional Facility had “allowed a cesspool of 
unconstitutional and inhuman acts and conditions to germinate, the 
sum of which places the offenders at substantial and ongoing risk.”172  
Among other appalling conditions, prison staff routinely had sex with 
underage inmates, “poorly-trained guards brutally beat youth and 
used excessive pepper spray,” and prison guards turned a blind eye to 
inmates possessing homemade knives that were used in “gang fights 
and inmate rapes.”173 
But is this decidedly-very-ugly-pig that much uglier than its public 
counterpart?  In a 2005 article, Sharon Dolovich concludes that a one-
to-one comparison of conditions in public and private prisons alike 
raises serious concerns about both types of institutions.174  Here are 
three more recent examples from a state that holds all of its in-state 
inmates in public facilities.175  In 2011, the Supreme Court decided 
what might be the biggest inmate human rights case of our time, 
Brown v. Plata.176  The case exposed the abysmal quality of physical 
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and mental healthcare provided in public California prisons.  Justice 
Kennedy, writing the Opinion of the Court on behalf of five Justices, 
detailed numerous horrific instances of systemic indifference, 
resulting in inmates sitting in their own human waste for hours, 
injuries and chronic conditions becoming worse and worse through 
medical neglect and maltreatment, and unnecessary, iatrogenic deaths 
at a rate of an inmate every six days.177  It is particularly poignant that 
these practices were so horrifying that, years before the decision, the 
courts had taken the prison health care system out of the hands of the 
state and placed it in the hands of a federal receiver178—but even that 
was not enough.179  Justice Kennedy grimly concluded: 
To incarcerate, society takes from prisoners the means to provide 
for their own needs.  Prisoners are dependent on the State for food, 
clothing, and necessary medical care.  A prison’s failure to provide 
sustenance for inmates “may actually produce physical ‘torture or a 
lingering death.’”  Just as a prisoner may starve if not fed, he or she 
may suffer or die if not provided adequate medical care.  A prison 
that deprives prisoners of basic sustenance, including adequate 
medical care, is incompatible with the concept of human dignity and 
has no place in civilized society.  If the government fails to fulfill this 
obligation, the courts have a responsibility to remedy the resulting 
Eighth Amendment violation.180 
Federal courts are currently in the process of hearing another 
lawsuit, Ashker v. Brown,181 which addresses the practice of solitary 
confinement in California.  In 2011 and 2013, inmates in California’s 
Pelican Bay and Corcoran institutions, as well as in other public 
correctional facilities, engaged in hunger strikes to protest against the 
conditions in the Security Housing Unit (SHU).182  These conditions 
included placement in small solitary cells for twenty-three hours a day 
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with no human contact for an indefinite period of time—sometimes 
lasting decades183—not for disciplinary violations, but for a suspicion 
of gang membership.184  The hunger strike ended only when Judge 
Thelton Henderson ordered that the inmates be force-fed.185 
In 2013, an exposé by the Center for Investigative Reporting 
uncovered a scandal of massive proportions: the sterilization of 
female inmates without proper state procedures.186  A subsequent 
2014 California Auditor examination uncovered 144 cases of tubal 
ligations performed in inmates between 2006 and 2010, thirty-nine of 
which were performed without consent and a further twenty-seven in 
which the inmates’ physicians did not sign the appropriate forms.187  
Interviews with the inmates that had undergone the procedure reveal 
disturbing degrees of paternalism and pressure on the part of medical 
staff.  “As soon as [the institution’s OB-GYN] found out that I had 
five kids,” recounted an inmate to the Sacramento Bee, “he suggested 
that I look into getting it done.  The closer I got to my due date, the 
more he talked about it. . . .  He made me feel like a bad mother if I 
didn’t do it.”188 
Many more examples of cruelty, laziness, and neglect in public 
prisons lead to the inevitable conclusion: incarceration conditions in 
the United States may differ across states and different types of 
institutions, but it is difficult to argue that private institutions, 
categorically, are worse than public ones.  Both pigs are ugly.  And as 
the next Subsection shows, criminal justice actors in the public sector 
are not at all immune from profit motivations when they engage in 
unconscionable behavior toward the people subjected to their control. 
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B. Profit-Seeking Aberrations and the Banality of Evil 
In 2008, many conscientious Americans were shocked to discover 
that two Philadelphia judges—Mark Ciavarella, the former President 
Judge of the Luzerne County Court of Common Pleas, and Michael 
Conahan, a Senior Judge in the same county—were indicted and 
convicted for accepting money from a private juvenile facility 
provider, Robert Mericle, in return for sentencing thousands of 
juvenile defendants harshly so they would be sent to the provider’s 
detention centers.189  Mericle, a real-estate developer, was a staunch 
supporter of Ciavarella’s election campaign,190 and Conahan struck a 
personal friendship with some organized crime leaders in Northeast 
Pennsylvania.191 
The defendants’ association with Mericle started with their support 
of cash for his juvenile facility venture in 2000–2001,192 and continued 
with their furnishing of Mericle’s facilities with revenue-raising 
bodies.193  Examples of their harsh sentencing for kickback included 
seven weeks detention for a thirteen-year-old’s minor violent 
incidents with his mother’s much-larger boyfriend,194 months of house 
arrest in anticipation of a confinement sentence for an epileptic 
fourteen-year-old girl accused of defacing stop signs with the 
inscription “vote for Michael Jackson,”195 a sixteen-year-old charged 
with “terroristic threats” for a prank and sentenced to an indefinite 
term at a privately-funded wilderness camp for girls,196 and a fifteen-
year-old who carelessly and mistakenly purchased a stolen motorbike 
sent to a term at a “boot camp” which led him to use drugs and 
exhibit signs of anxiety and depression, which brought him in and out 
of detention facilities for three years.197  While many of these 
sentences directly lined the judges’ pockets, some of them are more 
indirectly related to the kickbacks, and represent the indifference and 
cruelty that set in once they got used to commodifying human life.  
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The Juvenile Law Center found that hundreds of defendants were 
tried without receiving proper counsel.198 
Clearly, a serious culprit in this scandal is Robert Mericle, the 
juvenile facility provider, who paid the judges’ kickbacks.  One 
possible reading of this story is as an indictment against such 
institutions.  But in an environment in which public officials are not 
greedy, corrupt, and profit-seeking, a for-profit attempt to corrupt 
judges would not result in such horrific results.  William Ecenbager 
provides background that includes a lengthy history of political 
corruption,199 the judicial election system in thirty-nine states—
including Pennsylvania200—and the “tough love” change in the 
American approach to juvenile justice.201  In his account of the 
scandal, Ecenbager shows that pressures were exerted by the judges 
over the entire juvenile system in Pennsylvania, bullying lawyers and 
therapeutic personnel to collaborate with their schemes, sometimes 
openly stating that these policies were necessary because there were 
“bills to pay.”202 
Scandalous human rights crimes perpetrated for profit do not even 
require the partnership of a private actor; sometimes, a legislative 
lacuna suffices.  A 1939 Alabama law allowed the state’s sixty-seven 
sheriffs to pocket any leftover money they managed to save from the 
state’s allowance for feeding inmates in local institutions.203  In 2009, 
then-sheriff of Morgan County, Greg Bartlett, was charged and 
convicted for having pocketed $212,000 from the prison’s food 
budget, while the inmates were provided with inadequate food on 
$1.75 a day.204  His defense attorney argued that “everything he [had] 
done [was] by the rules, including the feeding allowance.”205  After 
Bartlett’s release from jail, he agreed to spend the food money solely 
on food and not keep any funds for his personal use.206  Currently, 
Sheriff Mike Rainey, who is calling on the legislature to end the 
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current system and allow county commissions to oversee the funds, 
has reportedly been donating most of his potential earnings to charity, 
to the tune of $10,000.207 
One would hope that Rainey’s public stance be the norm, rather 
than notable and unusual honesty, and that Bartlett’s deeds be 
exposed for the travesty they are.  However, Bartlett was defended in 
his trial by the Alabama Sheriffs’ Association, who stressed in his 
defense that he had not broken any laws, but merely exploited an 
existing system.208  And when local advocacy groups sought to find out 
how common this profiteering-on-food scheme was, the Director of 
the Alabama Sheriffs’ Association sent each sheriff a letter advising 
them to ignore the open records law.209   
Sarah Geraghty and Melanie Velez provide other examples of such 
enrichment: In South Georgia, Clinch County court officials had 
charged state court misdemeanants $10–15 in illegal fees, which were 
pocketed by court personnel.210  Interpreting these incidents as 
endemic to the Southern system does not obscure the fact that they 
consisted of exploiting an opaque system riddled with antiquated law 
to obtain personal profit. 
Lest it seem that these are extreme, idiosyncratic examples of 
cruelty and corruption, let us turn to much more ordinary profit-
seeking mechanisms of exploitation.  On May 15, 2014, the California 
legislature approved AB 1876, a bill designed to put an end to any 
prevailing practice among county correctional officers to profiteer 
from contracts with phone companies.  The new bill “prohibits a 
contract to provide telephone services to any person detained or 
sentenced to a jail or juvenile facility from including any commission 
or other payment . . . to the entity operating the jail or juvenile 
facility.”211 
The bill was designed to address a county loophole in phone 
contract regulation in local facilities.  In 2007, California passed a law 
phasing in reductions in the cost of prison phone calls, but it left the 
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county jail market open to abuse and exploitation.212  For example, in 
Contra Costa County, phone call rates amounted to triple what the 
state had put in place for state-owned facilities, and the commissions 
paid by the operator to the county were fifty-three percent.213  The 
money was reportedly directed to an “inmate welfare” fund, some of 
which was used for worthwhile programming, but, as commented in 
the Contra Costa Times, obtaining it via a profit-seeking kickback 
was a function of corrupt management.214  Similarly, the 2007 law 
pertaining to state prisons did not cover interstate-calling costs, 
making those prohibitively expensive and contact with out-of-state 
family virtually impossible for low-income families.215  Similar 
schemes that make phone calls prohibitively expensive, for prison 
authority profit, are the subject of civil rights campaigns in Virginia216 
and in the federal system.217 
These individuals and institutions were clearly operating with the 
intention to profit from their misdeeds.  That they were public 
officials, or public institutions, did not make them immune to greed or 
more sensitive to human suffering than their private counterparts.  
Indeed, much more mundane examples of “wheeling and dealing” 
demonstrate that, when public and private actors are faced with a 
shift in the profitability or sustainability of incarceration, they 
transform their behavior and adapt to the changing market conditions 
in surprisingly similar ways. 
This phenomenon can be illustrated by examining the changes in 
incarceration policies and practices following the Great Recession of 
2008.218  When incarceration became less sustainable and states began 
to feel the pressure to reduce their prison populations, private prison 
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companies offered their public clients “discounts” on the required 
occupancy rates in their institutions,219 while at the same time 
“diversifying their incarceration portfolio” by entering the 
undocumented immigrant detention market and advocating for anti-
immigration legislation.220  Responding to the same pressures, states 
turned to prison closures.221  States that managed to reduce their 
population tried to sell their unused correctional space to other 
states.222  States made decisions about housing inmates in state, or out-
of-state based on cost-benefit considerations.223 
Public and private actors alike, we can conclude, negotiate with 
each other, and with other actors, in order to respond to economic 
pressure.  Private prison companies are changing their contracts with 
state and local governments to account for lesser occupancy, and 
states buy and sell prison space from each other.  Not only are these 
two “pigs” so ugly that they defy comparison, they are both motivated 
by profit and cost-benefit analysis like the neoliberal subjects they 
are. 
CONCLUSION 
This Article’s journey into the inner workings of private and public 
correctional agencies leads to the inescapable conclusion that PIC 
critics who focus on private prison companies are missing the mark.  
By focusing specifically on private incarceration, they reinforce the 
traditional public/private divide, ignoring the realities of a fragmented 
market as well as a fragmented state.  Public institutions have 
privatized so many of their internal functions that they can hardly be 
differentiated from private ones.  Public actors behave in ways 
equally as atrocious and neglectful, and they respond to the same 
market pressure as their private counterparts. 
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A sober public choice perspective on incarceration (albeit one that 
does not necessarily subscribe to the political preferences of public 
choice) requires that critical prison literature abandon fantasy and 
acknowledge reality; fighting private incarceration companies is not 
only futile, but also misses the mark.  The problem is not the 
institutions themselves, but rather the fact that they cannot escape the 
neoliberal economy in which they operate. 
Calling attention to the horrifying, inhumane consequences of 
these market pressures is important, but so is designing solutions that 
might work.  Since the capitalist makeup of the state, and its 
contribution to the PIC, cannot be dismantled by raising 
consciousness to humanitarian concerns, the regulation correctional 
behavior must be altered so that it provides incentives to improve 
prison conditions. 
One such alteration might be shifting the compensation basis for all 
correctional institutions—private and public alike—from a per-diem 
basis to a recidivism-reduction basis.  In other words, inmate 
recidivism will be measured for each correctional institution, 
regardless of its management, and these institutions will be 
compensated and budgeted according to their accomplishments in 
recidivism reduction.  Such a system would prompt prison 
administrations to adopt rehabilitation programs proven to work and 
to seek reentry schemes for their inmates that will improve their lives 
overall and reduce the chance that they will return to prison.  It will 
also sever the link between better business and a larger number of 
inmates, and eliminate the incentive for lobbying for “tough on 
crime” propositions by public and private actors alike. 
In crafting this system, care must be taken to avoid a situation in 
which unsuccessful prisons simply close and all inmates are shuttled 
to successful prisons, making the latter, over time, overcrowded and 
unsuccessful.  This incentive structure must be accompanied by a plan 
to heal troubled prisons, which should include resources for 
implementing proven vocational and educational training programs.   
Everyone should be offered an opportunity to succeed in recidivism 
reduction.  Care must also be taken to foresee efforts to “game” the 
new system by admitting solely inmates who have better rehabilitative 
chances, by requiring that facilities accept inmates in their relevant 
security level on a random allocation basis. 
If, in light of such alterations in the compensation scheme, private 
prison companies decide that their business is no longer profitable, 
their exit from the field will not be mourned.  But if, indeed, private 
entrepreneurs respond better to financial initiatives than to 
accusations and limitations, let us push everyone in the correctional 
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business, whether they wear badges or business suits, to do well by 
doing good. 
